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# Training the Apostles of Liberal Culture: Black Higher Education, 1900–1935

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From the Reconstruction era through the Great Depression black higher education in the South existed essentially through a system of private liberal arts colleges. During this period, the federal government gave scant aid to black land-grant schools, and the southern states followed with a few funds for black normal schools and colleges. Between 1870 and 1890, nine federal black land-grant colleges were established in the South, and this number increased to sixteen by 1915. In that same year, there were also seven state-controlled black colleges in the South. These black federal land-grant and state schools, however, were colleges or normal schools in name only. According to the 1917 survey of black higher education conducted by Thomas Jesse Jones, only one of the sixteen black federal land-grant schools in the former slave states taught students at the collegiate level. The Florida Agricultural and Mechanical College enrolled 12 black college students. The seven black state colleges or normal schools had no black students enrolled in collegiate grades. Of the 7,513 students enrolled in the combined twenty-three black land-grant and state schools, 4,061 were classified as elementary level students, 3,400 were considered secondary level students and, as mentioned above, only 12 were actually enrolled in the collegiate curriculum. In 1915 there were 2,474 black students enrolled in collegiate grades in the southern states and the District of Columbia, and only 12 of them attended land-grant and state schools. Hence, as late as World War I virtually all of the black college students in the southern states were enrolled in privately owned colleges. This structure of black higher education, albeit significantly improved, persisted into the late 1920s. Arthur J. Klein's 1928 survey of black higher education demonstrated that the private black colleges were nearly all the sole promoters of higher education for Afro-American students. For the academic year 1926–1927, these were 13,860 black college students in America, and approximately 75 percent of them were enrolled in private colleges. By the mid-1930s, this situation had changed and black college students in public institutions accounted for 43 percent of the total black college enrollment in the sixteen former slave states and District of Columbia. Until this time, however, private philanthropy largely determined the shape and even the survival of southern black higher education.<sup>1</sup>

In the South the history of black higher education from 1865 to 1935 involves largely a study of the interrelationship between philanthropy and black communities—or at least black leaders—in the development of colleges and professional schools for black youth. Three separate and distinct philanthropic groups formed the power structure in black higher education during this period. At the beginning of the Reconstruction era northern white benevolent societies and denominational bodies (missionary philanthropy) and black religious organizations (Negro philanthropy) established the beginnings of a system of higher education for black southerners. The third group of philanthropists was large corporate philanthropic foundations and wealthy individuals (industrial philanthropy). They had been involved in the development of black common schools and industrial normal schools since the Reconstruction era, but in 1914 they turned their attention to plans for the

systematic development of a few select institutions of black higher education. From the late nineteenth century through the first third of the twentieth century these various groups of philanthropists debated the role of higher education in the overall scheme of black education and the relationship of classical liberal training to larger issues of black political and economic life. At the core of different educational ideologies and reform movements lay the central goal of preparing black leaders or "social guides," as they were sometimes called, for participation in the political economy of the New South. Each philanthropic group, therefore, took as its point of departure a particular view of the relationship of higher education to the "Negro's place" in the New South and shaped its educational policy and practices around that vision. The different philanthropic groups, particularly the missionary and industrial philanthropists, were in sharp disagreement over the ends and means of black education in general. Most visible were their divergent conceptions of the value and purpose of black higher education.

The northern mission societies, which were most prominent in the early crusade to establish institutions of higher education for the ex-slaves, were also largely responsible for sustaining the leading black colleges. The American Missionary Association (AMA) colleges for the freed people included Fisk University, Straight University (now Dillard), Talladega College, and Tougaloo College. The Freedmen's Aid Society of the Methodist Episcopal church founded Bennett College, Clark University, Claflin College, Meharry Medical College, Morgan College, Philander Smith College, Rust College, and Wiley College. The American Baptist Home Mission Society (ABHMS) administered Benedict College, Bishop College, Morehouse College, Shaw University, Spelman Seminary, and Virginia Union University. The Presbyterian Board of Missions for Freedmen maintained Biddle University (now Johnson C. Smith), Knoxville College, and Stillman Seminary. The major nondenominational colleges operated by independent boards of northern missionaries were Atlanta University, Howard University, and Leland University.<sup>2</sup>

The leading Negro philanthropic organization was the African Methodist Episcopal church, which paved the way for black religious denominations to establish and maintain colleges for black students. The leading AME colleges were Allen University, Morris Brown College, and Wilberforce College. Other AME schools were Paul Quinn College, Edward Waters College, Kittrell College, and Shorter College. The college work fostered by the African Methodist Episcopal Zion church was confined to one institution, Livingstone College. The Colored Methodist Episcopal church owned and operated four colleges: Lane, Paine, Texas, and Miles Memorial. The bulk of educational work on the college level promoted by black Baptist denominations was carried on in schools under the control of the American Baptist Home Mission Society. Still, several state conventions of black Baptists undertook to provide higher education for black youth in pressing areas not provided for by the ABHMS. Black colleges founded by the black Baptists included Arkansas Baptist College, Selma University, and Virginia College and Seminary. Most of the colleges financed by black religious organizations were small and inadequately equipped, but so were those administered by white religious organizations. According to Arthur Klein's 1928 survey of black colleges, black church organizations had been able to provide an average annual income for their colleges in excess of that for institutions operated by the northern white denominational boards. Black religious organizations owned so few of the total number of black colleges, however, that less than 15 percent of the total number of black college students were enrolled in institutions sponsored by those organizations. The black colleges supported and controlled by white missionary philanthropists enrolled a sizable majority of black college and professional students.<sup>3</sup>

The missionary philanthropists rallied their colleagues to support classical liberal education for black Americans as a means to achieve racial equality in civil and political life. They assumed that the newly emancipated blacks would move into mainstream national culture, largely free to do and become what they chose, limited only by their own intrinsic worth and effort. It was supposed axiomatically, in other words, that the former slaves would be active participants in the republic on an equal footing with all other citizens. Education, then, according to the more liberal and dominant segments of missionary philanthropists, was intended to prepare a college-bred black leadership to uplift the black masses from the legacy of slavery and the restraints of the postbellum caste system. The AMA's "civilizing mission" demanded permanent institutions of higher education that could

educate exceptional black youth to become leaders of their people. Thus the missionary philanthropists valued the higher education of black leaders over all other forms of educational work. To these philanthropists, black leadership training meant, above all, higher classical liberal education. This view reflected, on one hand, their paternalistic tendencies to make unilateral decisions regarding the educational needs of blacks. On the other hand, such enthusiastic support for black higher education expressed—making due allowance for exceptions—the missionaries' principled liberalism, which was innocent of any inclination to doubt the intellectual potential of black Americans. As the Freedmen's Aid Society put it, "This society (in connection with similar organizations) has demonstrated to the South that the freedmen possess good intellectual abilities and are capable of becoming good scholars. Recognizing the brotherhood of mankind and knowing that intellect does not depend upon the color of the skin nor the curl of the hair, we never doubted the Negro's ability to acquire knowledge, and distinguish himself by scholarly attainments." It was the mission societies' primary duty, argued one philanthropist, "to educate . . . a number of blacks and send them forth to regenerate their own people."<sup>4</sup>

To be sure, missionary philanthropists were not proposing social changes that were revolutionary by national standards, but they were radical within the southern social order. Equality was carefully defined as political and legal equality. They consented to inequality in the economic structure, generally shied away from questions of racial integration, and were probably convinced that blacks' cultural and religious values were inferior to those of middle-class whites. Their liberalism on civil and political questions was matched by their conservatism on cultural, religious, and economic matters. Missionary philanthropists held that slavery had generated pathological religious and cultural practices in the black community. Slavery, not race, kept blacks from acquiring the important moral and social values of thrift, industry, frugality, and sobriety, all of which were necessary to live a sustained Christian life. In turn, these missing morals and values prevented the development of a stable family life among Afro-Americans. Therefore, missionaries argued, it was essential for education to introduce the ex-slaves to the values and rules of modern society. Without education, they concluded, blacks would rapidly degenerate and become a national menace to American civilization. In vital respects, such views are easily identified with the more conservative retrogressionist ideologies of the late nineteenth century. Generally, retrogressionist arguments, as George Fredrickson and Herbert Gutman have shown, supported the advocacy of various forms of external control over blacks, including disfranchisement and increasingly rigorous legal segregation.<sup>5</sup>

For the equalitarian missionaries, black economic and social conditions merely reflected the debasing effects of slavery and had nothing to do with racial characteristics. They saw no reason not to extend equal civil and political rights to black Americans. Moreover, because blacks were mentally capable and entitled to equal rights under the law, education was viewed as a means to liberate the former slaves from the effects of enslavement. In the words of the Freedmen's Aid Society, "Let us atone for our sins, as much as possible, by furnishing schools and the means of improvement for the children, upon whose parents we have inflicted such fearful evils. Let us lend a helping hand in their escape from the degradation into which we have forced them by our complicity with oppressors. Justice, stern justice, demands this at our hands. Let us pay the debt we owe this race before we complain of weariness in the trifling sums we have given for schools and churches." Consequently, the missionary philanthropists conducted a continual criticism of the political disfranchisement, civil inequality, mob violence, and poor educational opportunities that characterized black life in the American South. From this perspective, they supported the training of a black college-bred leadership to protect the masses from "wicked and designing men."<sup>6</sup>

The mission societies started their educational crusade by concentrating upon schools for elementary level training, but by the early 1870s their emphasis had shifted to the establishment and maintenance of higher educational institutions. In 1870, the AMA, for example, had 157 common schools. By 1874, that number had declined to 13. In the meantime, however, the number of AMA colleges, high schools, and normal schools increased from 5 in 1867 to 29 in 1872 with the primary objective of training black youth as teachers. The AMA and other missionary philantrop-

pists believed that common school and eventually secondary education were a state and local responsibility to be shared by private societies only until it could be assumed by state governments. Their colleges, however, were to be permanent. From the outset, the missionaries named their key institutions "colleges" and "universities," although most of their students were scarcely literate and virtually all of them were enrolled at the subcollegiate level. These labels, as Horace Mann Bond stated, "tell us that the founders took emancipation seriously, believing that the Civil War had settled, indeed, the issue of human inequality in the nation; they also tell us that the founders were applying, to the newly freed population, the ancient faith in the efficacy of higher education to elevate a people." The missionary colleges did not, as was often charged, offer their black students collegiate studies before they were ready. For instance, classes opened at the AMA's Talladega College in November 1867. All 140 students were in the elementary grades. Officials did not begin planning college work until 1878, and no such courses were outlined in the catalog until 1890. The first bachelor's degree was not granted until 1895. Generally, the missionaries developed their institutions of higher education at a reasonable and responsible pace.<sup>7</sup>

Consistent with their view of the need for a well-trained black leadership, the missionaries made liberal culture rather than industrial training the chief aim of their curriculum. The courses in the black colleges controlled by missionaries were similar to those in a majority of contemporary liberal arts schools. Freshmen studied Latin, Greek, and mathematics. Sophomores were taught Greek, Latin, French, mathematics, and natural science. Juniors studied the same courses with additional work in German, natural philosophy, history, English, and astronomy. Mental and moral science and political science were added for the seniors. Regular studies were supplemented at stated times with required essays, debates, declamations, and original addresses. Missionary colleges offered at least a smattering of industrial courses—mainly agriculture, building trades, and domestic science—but normally these courses were offered in the secondary or grammar grades. Some college students took manual training courses because these courses were usually connected with student work programs that allowed them to work their way through school. Industrial training, however, had no major role in the missionaries' philosophy and program of training a leadership class to guide the ex-slaves in their social, economic, and political development. In 1896 Henry L. Morehouse became the first to use the words "talented tenth" to describe this philosophy and program of black education. W. E. B. Du Bois would soon make the concept central to his writings on higher education. As Morehouse put it, "In all ages the mighty impulses that have propelled a people onward in their progressive career, have proceeded from a few gifted souls." The "talented tenth" should be "trained to analyze and to generalize" by an education that would produce "thoroughly disciplined minds." From the missionaries' vantage point, this could be accomplished only through a solid grounding in the classical liberal curriculum.<sup>8</sup>

Between 1865 and 1900, there were tensions between the denominational missionary societies and the black leadership, but generally not over the question of curriculum. Black leaders also believed that the "Negro problem" could be solved most quickly through the training of southern black youth—mostly males—in the best traditions of New England culture and by sending such college-bred persons among the masses as scholars, ministers, doctors, lawyers, businessmen, and politicians. Colleges such as Fisk, Atlanta, and Howard were viewed as social settlements that imparted the culture of New England to black boys and girls along with the culture of the Greeks and Romans. During the first third of the twentieth century blacks would begin to modify this philosophy of education to include the scientific study of black life and culture as Du Bois so successfully inaugurated at Atlanta University in 1900 and as Carter G. Woodson initiated with the founding of the *Journal of Negro History* in 1916. But until this time black leaders and missionary philanthropists generally agreed that the transplanted New England college in southern soil was the proper way to educate the sons and daughters of ex-slaves. This shared conception of the appropriate education of black leaders was reflected in the curriculum of colleges owned and operated by black religious organizations. Languages and mathematics received greater emphasis than the other courses in these colleges. The required subjects usually included Latin, Greek, English, mathematics, elementary sciences, history, and mental and moral philosophy. The electives included Latin, French, German, chemistry, physics, and biology. Thus it was agreed that prospec-

tive black leaders could not be properly educated for teaching and leadership positions through industrial education. When the time came that white students who planned to become teachers, doctors, lawyers, ministers, and professors "should learn to hoe and plow and lay bricks rather than go to literary and classical schools," wrote President James G. Merrill of Fisk in 1901, "it will be the right policy to shut off all our literary and classical schools for negroes in the South." Consequently, despite sharp tensions between missionaries and black leaders over questions of black participation in the administration and faculty of missionary colleges, the two groups shared a common conception of the appropriate training of black leaders, and this common ground kept relations fairly harmonious. Both groups believed in the "talented tenth" theory.<sup>9</sup>

How did the "talented tenth" theory work out in practice? Between 1865 and 1900, the positive accomplishments of black higher education were impressive. Of all the evaluations that could be cited, the most profound and most eloquent was penned by Du Bois, who praised the early missionary philanthropists as "men radical in their belief in Negro possibility." By 1900, Du Bois continued, the black colleges supported by northern missionary and black religious organizations had "trained in Greek and Latin and mathematics, 2,000 men; and these men trained fully 50,000 others in morals and manners, and they in turn taught the alphabet to nine millions of men." The black colleges were far from perfect, concluded Du Bois, but "above the sneers of critics" stood "one crushing rejoinder: in a single generation they put thirty thousand black teachers in the South" and "wiped out the illiteracy of the majority of the black people of the land."<sup>10</sup>

Yet in 1900, the mission societies and black religious organizations knew that their existing institutions had many defects, that they had nowhere near the amount of capital needed to correct those defects, and that the production of black college and professional students and graduates was minuscule compared to the number needed merely to fill the educational, medical, legal, and ministerial positions in a segregated black community. As illustrated in Table 1, in 1900 there were 3,880 black students in colleges and professional schools and fewer than 400 graduates of college and professional programs. These new graduates were added to the existing pool of about 3,000 other graduates in a total black population of nearly 10 million. A decade later less than one-third of 1 percent of college-age blacks were attending college compared with more than 5 percent among whites. The ratio of black physicians to the total black population was 1 to 3,194 compared to 1 to 553 among whites; for lawyers the black ratio was 1 to 12,315 compared with 1 to 718 among whites; for college professors, 1 to 40,611 among blacks and 1 to 5,301 among whites; and in the teaching profession there was 1 black teacher for every 334 black persons compared with a ratio of 1 to 145 for whites. The small number and percentage of blacks enrolled in colleges and professional schools demonstrated clearly that nowhere near 10 percent of the college-age black population benefitted from higher education. However aggressively missionary and black religious leaders defended the wisdom of providing classical liberal education for the "talented tenth," they admitted to themselves that they had fallen far short of their goal, and they saw no light at the end of the tunnel.<sup>11</sup>

Meanwhile, beginning in the 1880s, industrial philanthropy, which had paralleled the growth of missionary and black religious philanthropy, placed its emphasis almost exclusively on industrial training. Industrial philanthropy began in the postbellum South with the educational reforms of the northern-based Peabody Educational Fund, which was founded in 1867 and was boosted by the establishment of the John F. Slater Fund in 1882. From the outset, the leaders of the industrial philanthropic foundations favored racial inequality in the American South and attached themselves early on to the Hampton Idea. Encouraged by Hampton's success, the trustees of the Slater Fund decided to concentrate their grants on industrial education. After 1890, J. L. M. Curry, former slaveholder and congressman in the antebellum South, assumed the position of field agent for both the Peabody and Slater funds and advanced further the Hampton-Tuskegee program of industrial education. With so much emphasis on Negro industrial training by such wealthy and prominent organizations and individuals, the black colleges came in for a good deal of direct and indirect criticism. Much was said of black sharecroppers who sought to learn Latin and knew nothing of farming, of pianos in cabins, and of college-bred Afro-Americans unable to obtain jobs.<sup>12</sup>

TABLE 1  
*Black College and Professional Students and  
 Graduates in Southern States and the District of Columbia, by Sex, 1900*

State or District of Columbia	College students		Professional students		College and pro- fessional students Total	College graduates		Professional graduates		College and pro- fessional graduates Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female	
Alabama	23	10	206	35	274	3	1	6	7	17
Arkansas	49	21	66	0	136	3	1	0	0	4
Delaware	12	8	0	0	20	1	0	0	0	1
District of Columbia	357	125	326	32	840	3	0	47	11	61
Florida	1	0	16	0	17	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	223	67	183	67	540	6	3	23	1	33
Kentucky	18	18	23	0	59	0	0	3	0	3
Louisiana	23	12	41	12	88	6	3	11	7	27
Maryland	10	1	19	0	30	0	0	5	0	5
Mississippi	46	6	0	0	52	13	2	0	0	25
Missouri	12	1	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0
North Carolina	348	81	178	13	620	39	4	33	5	81
South Carolina	45	31	65	0	141	6	6	0	0	12
Tennessee	220	77	281	0	578	13	2	59	0	74
Texas	97	91	41	0	229	3	0	1	0	4
Virginia	47	6	108	0	161	9	0	18	0	27
West Virginia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1,561	606	1,553	159	3,880	105	22	206	31	364

Source: U.S. Commissioner of Education, *Report, 1899-1900* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901), 2: 2506-2507.

The industrial philanthropic foundations established in the early twentieth century followed the same pattern at least until the post-World War I period. The General Education Board, Anna T. Jeanes Foundation, Phelps-Stokes Fund, Carnegie Foundation, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, and Julius Rosenwald Fund, all established between 1902 and 1917, cooperated in behalf of the Hampton-Tuskegee program of black industrial training. Moreover, industrial philanthropists viewed the missionary program of black higher education as the futile and even dangerous work of misguided romantics. In 1899 Tuskegee trustee William H. Baldwin, Jr., expressed the industrial philanthropists' general disappointment with the missionary colleges. Summarizing the missionary educational work from the Reconstruction era to the end of the nineteenth century, Baldwin commented:

The days of reconstruction were dark for all. Their sting has not yet gone. Then appeared from the North a new army—an army of white teachers, armed with the spelling-book and the Bible; and from their attack there were many casualties on both sides, the southern whites as well as the blacks. For, although the spelling-book and the Bible were necessary for the proper education of the negro race, yet, with a false point of view, the northern white teacher educated the negro to hope that through the books he might, like the white men, learn to live from the fruits of a literary education. How false that theory was, thirty long years of experience has proved. That was not their opportunity. Their opportunity was to be taught the dignity of manual labor and how to perform it. We began at the wrong end. Instead of educating the negro in the lines which were open to him, he was educated out of his natural environment and the opportunities which lay immediately about him.

Convinced that what Afro-Americans needed most to learn was the discipline of manual labor and the boundaries of their "natural environment," Baldwin, like other industrial philanthropists, generally opposed the development of black higher education. "Except in the rarest of instances," Baldwin proclaimed, "I am bitterly opposed to the so-called higher education of Negroes." To be sure, he recognized that racial segregation of necessity required the existence of limited black higher education and professional opportunities to train needed professionals such as doctors, nurses, and social workers. Explicit in Baldwin's statements was the philosophy that higher education ought to direct black boys and girls to places in life that were congruent with the South's racial caste system, as opposed to providing them with the knowledge and experiences that created a wide, if not unlimited, range of social and economic possibilities. Further, the needs of the South's racially segregated society were to determine the scope and purpose of black higher education, not the interests and aspirations of individual students or the collective interests of black communities. As the first chairman of the General Education Board and an influential voice among northern industrial philanthropists, Baldwin helped channel the funds of these philanthropic foundations into black industrial schools and white colleges. Yet, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, he was not alone in this effort. Industrial philanthropists in general were opposed to black higher education, except in the rarest of instances, and did not change their position until after World War I.<sup>13</sup>

Thus a convergence of circumstances—the lack of federal and state support for the development of black higher education, the opposition of industrial philanthropy, and the impoverishment of missionary and black religious philanthropy—combined to retard the development of black higher education during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Most important, the key promoters of black higher education, missionary and black religious societies, could not accumulate the large amounts of capital required to place black colleges on solid financial grounds. Though they plodded on persistently, preserving a modest system of black collegiate education, their nineteenth-century momentum declined sharply after 1900. By the turn of the century, the mission societies were virtually bankrupt, and their campaign to develop black higher education was rapidly diminishing in scope and activity. In looking at the future of their black colleges, the missionary philanthropists had many reasons to be downhearted. By any standard, the material and financial status of black higher education was bad. Black colleges were understaffed, meagerly equipped, and poorly financed. The combined efforts of the missionary and black organizations could not raise sufficient funds to meet annual operating expenses, increase teachers' salaries, expand the physical plant, improve libraries, or purchase new scientific and technical equipment. Indeed, almost all of the missionary black colleges lacked sufficient endowments to ensure their survival. Of the one hundred black colleges and normal schools in 1914–1915, two-thirds had no endowment funds; and the remaining third had a combined total of only \$8.4 million. Most of this sum belonged to Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes, which had attracted large gifts from industrial philanthropists in support of industrial education. In 1926 the total endowment of ninety-nine black colleges and normal schools had risen to \$20.3 million, and more than \$14 million of this belonged to Hampton and Tuskegee Institutes; the ninety-seven remaining institutions had a combined total of \$6.1 million. As late as 1912, seventy-five black colleges had either a negligible endowment or none at all.<sup>14</sup>

The relative impoverishment of black "colleges" and "universities" made it difficult for them to increase their college-level enrollments, which were already extremely small. In the academic year 1899–1900, only fifty-eight of the ninety-nine black colleges had any collegiate students. The proportion of collegiate and professional students in these ninety-nine institutions was small in relation to their precollegiate enrollment, which amounted to 27,869. These precollegiate students constituted more than nine-tenths of the total number of students enrolled in black colleges. This pattern had not changed significantly by World War I. In 1915 only thirty-three black private institutions were "teaching any subjects of college grade." The lack of good academic elementary and secondary schools for southern black students forced the black colleges to provide training for pupils at lower levels to help meet the educational needs of local black communities. Of the 12,726 students attending these institutions in 1915, 79 percent were in the elementary and secondary

grades. Many institutions were endeavoring to maintain college classes for less than 5 percent of their enrollment. Thus, lacking an adequate supply of high schoolers to enter the freshman course, the black colleges enrolled elementary and secondary students mainly as a means to feed their college departments. These enrollment patterns in black colleges differed significantly from the national pattern. In 1900 approximately one-quarter of all students enrolled in American colleges were in precollegiate programs. As late as the 1930s, the black precollegiate enrollment represented about 40 percent of the total enrollment in black institutions of higher learning.<sup>15</sup>

Another important development, which threatened the survival of the missionary colleges and black higher education in general, was the establishment of national and regional accrediting agencies. In the late nineteenth century regional accrediting agencies such as the Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, and the New England Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools were formed to give more fixed meanings to the terms "high school," "college," and "university." In the early twentieth century these regional accrediting agencies were joined by national standardizing organizations such as the College Entrance Examination Board and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Before 1913, accrediting agencies worked mainly to establish closer relations among institutions of higher learning, to standardize college admission requirements, and to improve the academic quality of college and university education. Beginning in 1913, however, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools issued the first list of regionally accredited colleges and universities, which signaled the movement to define institutions of higher learning by specific, factual, mechanical, and uniform standards. This movement, financed by foundations like Carnegie, increased the pressures on black colleges to become full-fledged institutions of higher learning.<sup>16</sup>

In one sense, standardization or accrediting was a voluntary action. No institution was surveyed for the purpose of accreditation except upon application. Nevertheless, it was virtually impossible for a college or university to exist as an important institution without the approval of these rating bodies. The nonattainment or removal of accreditation, whether by a regional or national accrediting agency, was a serious detriment to the welfare of an institution. The mere publication of accredited schools had an adverse effect upon institutions that did not appear on the lists. Whether students were graduates of accredited or nonaccredited institutions figured significantly in job opportunities, acceptance to graduate and professional schools, and the acquisition of required state certificates to practice professions from teaching to medicine.<sup>17</sup>

Although no formal accrediting agency took black colleges seriously until 1928, when the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools decided to rate black institutions separately, there were several evaluations of black higher education from 1900 to 1928. In 1900 and 1910 W. E. B. Du Bois made the first attempts to evaluate and classify the black colleges. In 1900 Du Bois listed thirty-four institutions as "colleges" with a total collegiate enrollment of 726 students. He concluded, however, that these 726 students could have been accommodated by the ten institutions which he rated as first-grade colleges. In 1910 Du Bois made a second and more careful evaluation of black higher education in which he attempted to classify thirty-two black colleges. Institutions like Howard, Fisk, Atlanta, Morehouse, and Virginia Union were classified as "First-Grade Colored Colleges." Lincoln, Talladega, and Wilberforce were examples of the "Second-Grade Colored Colleges," and schools such as Lane, Bishop, and Miles Memorial were included under the label "other colored colleges." Du Bois's evaluation was, on balance, a friendly one designed to strengthen the black college system by concentrating college-level work in about thirty-two of the better black institutions. But in 1917, Thomas Jesse Jones, director of research for the Phelps-Stokes Fund, published a critical attack upon black higher education that questioned the legitimacy of nearly all black institutions of higher learning. From 1914 to 1916, Jones conducted a survey of black higher education for the Federal Bureau of Education that resulted in a two-volume book. In the volume on black colleges he identified only two institutions as capable of offering college-level work. These were Howard University and Fisk University. In Jones's words, "hardly a colored college meets the standards set by the Carnegie Foundation and the North Central Association." These rating agencies required, among other things, that accredited colleges maintain at least six departments or



professorships with one professor giving full time to each department. The college's annual income had to be sufficient to maintain professors with advanced degrees and to supply adequate library and laboratory facilities. The rating agencies also held that the operation of a preparatory department at the high school level was undesirable, and in no case could it be under the same faculty and discipline as the college. Finally, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools recommended that accredited colleges possess an endowment of at least \$200,000. At that time, Hampton and Tuskegee were the only black institutions with substantial endowments, and these industrial normal schools did not offer collegiate courses. For Jones, his findings strongly suggested that only two or three black institutions were equipped to become accredited colleges. Hence he recommended that the remaining "colleges" convert to secondary, elementary, and normal schools. Undoubtedly his views were harsh and unwarranted, reflecting significantly his bias toward the Hampton-Tuskegee model of industrial education. Still, Jones's survey, backed by the Federal Bureau of Education and northern industrial philanthropic foundations, underscored a major crisis in black higher education. Black colleges, however segregated, could not exist apart from the power and control of white standardizing agencies. It had become apparent to missionary philanthropists and black educators that their institutions were compelled to seek admission to the society of standardized colleges and on terms defined by all-white regional and national rating agencies. Thus for black institutions of higher learning, rating by accrediting agencies was a primary goal in the post-World War I era.<sup>18</sup>

The crucial threats to the survival of black higher education could not be met effectively by missionary philanthropists or black organizations, and the black colleges were forced to seek help from industrial philanthropists. As early as 1901, Thomas J. Morgan, then corresponding secretary for the American Baptist Home Mission Society, requested fellow Baptist John D. Rockefeller to "assume the expense of fully equipping" eight of the society's leading colleges. Writing to Wallace Buttrick, Rockefeller's adviser in philanthropic affairs, Morgan suggested several ways to support black colleges: "(a) by endowing each school separately; (b) by placing in the hands of the ABHMS a lump endowment sum; (c) the creation of a fund placed in the hands of trustees especially selected for the purpose; or (d) the donation of Mr. Rockefeller annually of such a sum of money as may be essential to carry on the work." Between 1901 and 1908, the ABHMS's leading members, Morgan, Malcolm MacVicar, Henry L. Morehouse, George Sale, and George Rice Hovey, wrote to Wallace Buttrick pleading for grants to keep their black colleges financially solvent. In January 1908, George Sale made a specific request for funds to improve the ABHMS's Virginia Union University. He listed four important needs: a dormitory that would cost at least \$40,000; two residences adjoining the campus for the accommodation of teachers that would cost \$3,000 each; increases in the salaries of continuing instructors; and most urgently, to raise the quality of its instructional program by adding faculty positions in pedagogy, history, and social science. For these purposes, Sale asked the General Education Board to make appropriations as follows: \$20,000 toward the cost of the dormitory; \$3,000 toward the purchase of the two residences for teachers; and \$3,000 for faculty salaries. All requests were denied. The missionaries' correspondence with Wallace Buttrick and the General Education Board reveals the growing impoverishment of their societies relative to the financial resources necessary to keep their colleges abreast of modern standards. In 1901 Morgan wrote: "Reflecting upon the future of our educational work it seems to me we have reached an actual crisis that demands very careful consideration. Suppose, for instance, that the Society is obliged to carry on the work as heretofore. What shall we do? It is exceedingly difficult to secure money to keep the schools up to their present degree of efficiency and it is uncertain whether the present interest in the schools can be kept up among the churches and individuals." In Morgan's view, black colleges simply could "not expect too much of the Society in the immediate future with reference to enlargement, improvement, and increased costs." Likewise, George Rice Hovey, president of the ABHMS's Virginia Union University, said to Buttrick: "We, I fear, can never accomplish the work that we ought to do if we rely solely on the missionary society." Hovey's assessment characterized the general state of northern missionary societies for by the turn of the century, they had become too weak financially to keep their colleges abreast of modern standards. Unfortunately, the missionaries became bankrupt at a time when black colleges depended almost exclusively upon private aid.<sup>19</sup>

Significantly, although some of the missionaries threw themselves upon the mercy of the General Education Board—knowing full well the board's practice of contributing funds only to industrial schools—they were unwilling to compromise their primary mission of sustaining classical liberal colleges for the training of the black "talented tenth." George Sale, though careful not to attack industrial education, informed Buttrick that "the wisest policy for Virginia Union University is to place emphasis on its college and college preparatory work." Thomas J. Morgan recalled that from the beginning the ABHMS's schools had incorporated a smattering of industrial courses. Although he was favorable to the engrafting upon missionary colleges courses in industrial training, Morgan believed it would be a great misfortune to convert them to the trade school mission. In his letters to Buttrick, he constantly reaffirmed the ABHMS's commitment to its traditional philosophy of black education. As he wrote in January 1901,

The one all-important function of these institutions, the work to which they must give their strength for many years to come is that of raising up a competent leadership; men and women who can think; who are independent and self-reliant; who can persuade and lead their people; they should be men and women who are themselves models and examples of what their people can and ought to become, especially should they be persons capable of teaching and preaching. No modification of their curriculum or their spirit and purpose should be allowed to interfere in any manner with this as the supreme purpose of their existence.

A day later, lest Buttrick forget, Morgan repeated the same philosophy: "I feel very keenly the sense of responsibility for using what little influence I may have in developing our schools to a high grade, so that they may offer to the ambitious and competent young Negroes the best possible opportunities for self-culture, development, training and preparation for life's duties." What worried the industrial philanthropists was the probability that such ambitious and competent young college-bred Negroes would impart their knowledge and culture to secondary and normal school students who would in turn transmit classical liberal education to the common schools, leaving no central role in the basic structure of black education for the Hampton-Tuskegee model of industrial training.<sup>20</sup>

On the surface it appeared that the two camps might reach a compromise because one group emphasized college training and the other precollegiate education. Booker T. Washington, for example, publicly supported higher education for black elites. Washington stated: "In saying what I do in regard to industrial education, I do not wish to be understood as meaning that the education of the negro should be confined to that kind alone, because we need men and women well educated in other directions; but for the masses, industrial education is the supreme need." No compromise was practical, however, because both the supporters of classical liberal and industrial education looked to the same group to spread their ideas to the masses of black citizens. They both believed that the education of black teachers was most critical to the long-term training and development of the larger black community. If the teachers were to be, as Morgan said, "models and examples of what their people can and ought to be," there was little chance that the two camps could reach a compromise regarding the proper training of black teachers. Their conceptions of what black people could and ought to be in the American South were simply too divergent and conflicting to reach any sound agreement on the training of teachers of black southerners. In the pre-World War I period, therefore, industrial philanthropists could not bring themselves to support the expansion of black higher education because they viewed it as an infringement upon terrain they aspired to occupy and control. In 1914 Buttrick expressed a fundamental difference between the missionaries' and industrialists' view of the appropriate structure of black higher education. "I have long believed that there should be developed in the South two or three strong institutions of higher learning for the Negroes and, further, that something should be done to develop two, or possibly three, of the medical schools for Negroes," wrote Buttrick to John D. Rockefeller, Jr. "The difficulty in any attempt to promote institutions of higher learning," continued Buttrick, "is the fact that most of the Christian denominations have each founded several such schools." Indeed, altogether they had founded more than one hundred such schools. Buttrick wanted to reduce the number of black

colleges and professional schools to six and thereby leave the larger field of teacher training to industrial normal and county training schools. The denominations wanted not only to maintain their more than one hundred "colleges" and professional schools but to improve and expand them. The missionaries' plans were diametrically opposed to the industrial philanthropists' conception of the proper scope and function of black higher education.<sup>21</sup>

Although the industrial philanthropists refused to support the missionaries' plans for the development of black higher education, they had no intentions of abandoning black collegiate and professional education. Because industrial philanthropists appropriated virtually no money for black higher education before 1920, they were often perceived as committed exclusively to the idea of Negro industrial education. This was a misperception. In 1907 Buttrick stated well his colleagues' attitude toward black higher education: "I am convinced that all members of the [General Education] Board believe that there should be a sufficient number of thoroughgoing colleges for colored people in the southern states." Further, he was inclined to agree with his fellow trustees "that the matter of collegiate education for the colored people should be taken up as a whole by this Board." In fact, as Buttrick informed George Sale, superintendent of Negro education for the ABHMS, the board had already designated one of its "School Inspectors" to make "a careful study of the whole question" of black higher education. This report, completed in May 1907 by W. T. B. Williams of Hampton Institute, set forth basic reasons to develop a small number of strong black colleges in the South. First, these institutions would produce college-bred leaders to acculturate black Americans into the values and mores of southern society. Second, it was very important that black leaders be trained in the South by institutions "in touch with the conditions to be faced by the young people in later life rather than in the North by institutions . . . out of touch with southern life." Third, and most important, the development of a few strong institutions was viewed as a strategic means to reduce the number of existing black colleges. Williams argued:

If more strong men and good college courses, and better equipment both in the way of dormitories and apparatus could be added in a few places, and some scholarships or student aid in the college department, could be provided, as is common in the great northern universities, the mass of Negro college students would congregate in these few institutions and their numbers would steadily increase. This would render impossible many of the weaker college courses and would make for strength in organization and economy in the management of college training, for it would minimize duplication.

Williams expressed an interesting and noteworthy effect of standardization which was not so marked and known. If a few outstanding black colleges were established, industrial philanthropists could use these institutions to pressure the remaining ones into discontinuing their collegiate courses because of their inability to keep pace with the rising standards of college-level work. Buttrick regarded Williams's report as "so valuable that in my judgement all the members of the Board ought to read it just as it stands."<sup>22</sup>

Despite an apparent similarity in principle, there was a fundamental difference between Williams's and Du Bois's proposals to reduce the number of black colleges. Du Bois believed that a smaller number of financially solvent black colleges, about thirty-three, was preferable to the larger number (one hundred) of weaker schools in constant danger of folding. Further, starting from the position that the black college enrollment was much too small, he believed that a smaller number of sound institutions could both improve their academic quality and expand their physical capacity to increase the overall number and proportion of black college students. Williams's report, consistent with the philanthropists' interests, recommended the concentration of black higher education in a few institutions, about four or six, as a means to reduce dramatically the opportunities for black students to pursue higher education. This proposal reflected the philanthropists' belief that far too many black students aspired to attend college, a belief that would not change significantly until southern states began requiring all teachers to have bachelor's degrees. In short, Du Bois recommended concentration and efficiency in black higher education to increase opportunities, whereas the Williams report to the General Education Board recommended concentration and efficiency to

reduce the scope of black higher education. Though their means were similar, they envisioned very different ends.

Williams's report impressed the board's trustees and spurred them to develop a formal rationale for the support of black higher education. Wallace Buttrick and Abraham Flexner were primarily responsible for formulating the board's policy. In 1910 Flexner became nationally known for writing Carnegie Foundation Bulletin No. 4, a detailed study titled "Medical Education in the United States and Canada." This survey and the policies derived from it foreshadowed the board's approach to black higher education. Flexner inspected 155 medical schools and reported their "appalling deficiencies," which led him to conclude that all but 31 of them should discontinue. After this report appeared, the Council of Medical Education of the American Medical Association intensified its efforts to eliminate "inferior" medical colleges. Much of the financial support for the medical reform movement was provided by the General Education Board. In 1911 the board appropriated \$1.5 million to Johns Hopkins Medical School for the purpose of setting standards in American medical education. Flexner was placed in charge of the board's medical reform program. His main goal was to develop a model of medical education that would force weaker institutions to shut down because of their inability to approximate the new standards. Clearly, this policy followed closely the suggestions contained in the Williams report, though there was no direct relation between the two.<sup>23</sup>

In 1914 Flexner became a trustee of the General Education Board and assistant secretary to Wallace Buttrick. In this capacity, he began to apply his medical model to the field of black higher education. Fortunately Flexner did not have to conduct a study of black higher education comparable to his investigation of American medical education. Both he and Buttrick were acutely aware of the survey of black higher education being conducted by Thomas Jesse Jones for the Federal Bureau of Education. They were in close contact with Jones and realized, early on, that they could rely upon his forthcoming survey as a "Flexner report" of black higher education. Buttrick informed John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in February 1914, that he was in "frequent conference" with Jones, and he assured Rockefeller that Jones's survey would "throw light" on the whole question of black education. Though Jones's survey was not published until 1917, by December 1914 Flexner was already convinced that it would sound the death knell for many black colleges as his medical report had done for the vast majority of American medical schools. Writing to Oswald Garrison Villard about the value of the Jones survey, Flexner proclaimed:

Dr. Jones is a disinterested and competent outsider whose report will separate the wheat from the chaff. After its appearance the public will have a source of information the accuracy and impartiality of which cannot be discredited. The situation here is not different in principle from that which once existed in reference to medical schools. There was an association of American medical colleges that could enforce no standards just because it meant that the members, in order to do this, would have to legislate against one another. After, however, the Carnegie Foundation Bulletin appeared, an entirely new situation was created. Since then things have been run by the better schools and the others are rapidly disappearing.

Jones, however, was not a disinterested outsider. As a former member of Hampton's faculty, he had helped develop the Hampton-Tuskegee approach to black education and as the director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund played a critical role in adapting the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy to Britain's African colonies. His two-volume survey of black education, published in 1917, espoused the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy. Anticipating the impact of the Jones survey, the General Education Board held its first interracial conference on Negro education in November 1915. The invited participants represented both the major black industrial and liberal arts institutions. Presidents Fayette A. McKenzie of Fisk University and John Hope of Morehouse College represented two of the most outstanding black private colleges. Others included Principal R. R. Moton of Tuskegee Institute, Principal H. B. Frissell of Hampton Institute, Abraham Flexner of the General Education Board, Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, W. T. B. Williams, field agent for the John F. Slater Fund, and James H. Dillard, president of the Anna T. Jeanes Foundation. This conference

brought together the forces that represented the industrial philanthropists' overall approach to the development of black education. On one hand, Frissell, Moton, Williams, Jones, Flexner, and Dillard exemplified the movement to spread industrial education throughout the Afro-American South as the all-pervasive educational curriculum. On the other, McKenzie and Hope symbolized the industrial philanthropists' developing commitment to influence the direction of black higher education.<sup>24</sup>

The discussions at this conference illuminated fundamental flaws in the Hampton-Tuskegee movement that ultimately forced industrial philanthropists to reshape their approach to the promotion of industrial education for the masses of black children. The discussions also pointed to the pressing need for industrial philanthropists to become involved in the development of black colleges and professional schools if they were to be successful in redirecting the scope and function of black higher education. The original Hampton-Tuskegee Idea had run its course by 1915 and was rapidly falling behind modern educational standards. It was based largely on a program of unskilled and semiskilled agricultural and industrial training, the discouraging of college and even high-quality secondary work, and a heavy emphasis on moral development and ideological training. This program had broken down under its own weight. The extreme emphasis on routinized labor, or "learning by doing," produced graduates who found it increasingly difficult to meet state and local academic requirements for teacher certification. In certain respects, southern state and local school authorities wanted Hampton-Tuskegee graduates as teachers because they were advertised as young black men and women who "knew their place" and who were uncontaminated by the pompous ideals of classical liberal education. Yet the South, as the nation, was emphasizing and implementing certain required standards of education for teachers and even demanding college degrees to teach in public high schools and normal schools.

Such changes presented serious challenges to the traditional Hampton-Tuskegee program. Defending this tradition, Hampton principal H. B. Frissell said: "To us at Hampton the doing of the thing is the important thing, and what we might call the academic side is comparatively secondary. We have got to learn to do by doing . . . the academic training is really secondary to the actual doing of the thing." The fundamental flaw in this approach was pointed out to Frissell and the other members of the conference by two of Hampton's prominent graduates, Robert R. Moton and W. T. B. Williams. Moton said: "I am a Hampton man. I went to the summer school [for teachers] two or three summers, and took gymnastics, nothing else, only on the physical side pure and simple." Williams maintained that such a poor academic program caused Hampton graduates to fall down on the job: "Even when they go to teach the elementary subjects they cannot bring any fresh information to the children." The ultimate defeat and embarrassment, as Moton recalled, was that Hampton could not find one of its own graduates sufficiently qualified to fill a teaching position at the Whittier Elementary Lab School located on Hampton's campus. In Moton's words: "We had to go to Howard University to get a man to help Miss Walter. With all our 1,200 graduates, we should have had a man we could have put in that place. We had no one with sufficient academic training for the Whittier school. That is what Miss Walter thought, and she is very loyal to us, so you see that is at our own Hampton school; after twenty-five years or so we ought to have been able to pick out some Hampton man for that work." Moton, who was in the process of leaving the Hampton staff to become principal of Tuskegee Institute, admitted that Tuskegee had similar problems. Its graduates were being kept out of the teaching profession because of poor academic training. Bruce R. Payne, president of the George Peabody College for Teachers, asked the next logical question, "What is the use of the Hampton training if we are not allowed to use it?" Hampton and Tuskegee were thus compelled to meet more modern and higher academic standards or continue producing students with insufficient academic training to pass certification standards required of entry-level teachers.<sup>25</sup>

The conference then shifted to the question of black higher education. H. B. Frissell asked the central question: "What is sound policy in respect to the number, scope, support, and development of higher academic institutions for Negroes?" Only John Hope questioned the relevance of engrafting vocational education on the college curriculum and stated firmly that he stood for the "modern sort of education" for black and white children. Flexner, speaking for the industrial philanthropists, insisted that black collegiate work was "very pretentious, and not calculated to get anywhere." Having tested some black college students in Latin, physics, and literature, he concluded ironically

that "if it had been Greek they could not have been more puzzled." Flexner then asked for Hope's reaction to the General Education Board's thoughts about means to reduce the number of existing black colleges: "Dr. Hope, what would be the effect of selecting four or five Negro colleges and building them up, making them good, honest, sincere, effective colleges so far as they went, and letting the others alone, not try to suppress them or consolidate them, but just let them 'sweat,' would that tend in the long run, to stigmatize the inferior institutions that they would give up, the way the poor medical schools are giving up?" Hope admitted that such a policy might pressure weaker colleges to discontinue, but he did not sanction this approach.<sup>26</sup>

Shortly after this conference, the General Education Board formed a Committee on Negro Education to review its overall policy for the development of black education, paying particular attention to the questions of supporting schools for the training of black teachers and the shaping of black higher education. The committee's report was submitted to the board on 27 January 1916. "A crying need in Negro education," the committee reported, "is the development of state supported schools for the training of Negro teachers." The committee realized, however, "that many decades will elapse before Negro education is adequately provided for through taxation." Therefore, the committee recommended that the board use its resources to strengthen private institutions that promised to render "important educational service." "It should perhaps be explained," the committee stated, "that in making this recommendation the Committee has in mind, first, industrial schools, such as those at Fort Valley, Manassas, Calhoun, and St. Helena—schools which, on a much smaller scale, are doing for their own vicinities the valuable work which Hampton and Tuskegee have done for the country at large." Second, the committee had in mind academic institutions. It observed:

The Negro is determined to have some opportunity for higher education, and certain Negroes have made good use of such opportunities as are open to the race. Of course, there are far too many Negro colleges and universities; and of this large number, not one is well equipped and manned on a sensible, modest scale. Wise cooperation with one or two institutions would be the most effective way of bringing order out of chaos, of distinguishing the real from the imitation.

Finally, the committee recommended support for black medical education. "The Negro physician has, in our judgment, a place in the South." It was recommended that the board support one or two black medical schools. Thus, in time, with these recommendations, the committee formulated principles calling first for support of industrial normal schools, second, for assisting one or two black colleges, and, third, for aiding one or two black medical schools. The board moved immediately to provide financial support for the smaller industrial schools, but a few years passed before any major campaigns were launched to assist black colleges and professional schools.<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile, a confluence of changing political and social developments in black America heightened the industrial philanthropists' interest in the scope and purpose of black higher education. Most important were the emergence of more militant post-World War I black leaders and the subsequent realization that the Hampton-Tuskegee coalition was rapidly losing political ground to the college-bred "New Negro." During the war blacks became increasingly intolerant of economic and social injustices, especially in the South, where white terrorist groups increased their brutal attacks upon black civilians while black soldiers fought on the battle front to "make the world safe for democracy." There developed in the South, and to a significant degree in other sections of the nation, a grave interracial crisis. Inflammatory rumors filled the air, suspicion and fear were rife, lynchings multiplied, race riots broke out in several northern and southern cities, and the embers of discontent smoldered in many more. The widespread racial repression in the South, coupled with labor shortages in the North, escalated the migration of blacks to northern urban areas. The white South, fearing the loss of a major proportion of its agricultural laborers, opposed the migration and used both legal and extralegal means to keep blacks from boarding the trains bound northward. Efforts to deprive blacks of even so basic a freedom as the right to migrate only served to exacerbate racial tensions. Robert R. Moton, then the leading black spokesperson for the Hampton-Tuskegee coalition, was awakened to the pervasive undercurrent of social unrest among black civilians when

he toured the South in 1918. Indeed, Moton was so alarmed that he felt compelled to alert President Woodrow Wilson to the ever-present danger. In June 1918, Moton wrote a confidential letter to the president:

There is more genuine restlessness and dissatisfaction on the part of the colored people than I have before known. I have just returned from trips in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. It seems to me something ought to be done pretty definitely to change the attitudes of these millions of black people; and this attitude, anything but satisfactory, not to use a stronger word, is due very largely to recent lynchings and burnings of colored people. The recent lynching in Georgia of six people in connection with a murder, and among them a woman, who it is reported was a prospective mother, has intensified tremendously this attitude of the colored people.

In Moton's view, blacks en masse were on the brink of becoming "indifferent or antagonistic" or "quietly hostile."<sup>28</sup>

After the signing of the Armistice in 1918, race relations in America deteriorated further. The South and the nation were shaken by the "Red Summer" of 1919, when a series of major riots threatened to precipitate widespread race warfare. Significantly, the Hampton-Tuskegee moderates, who traditionally served as mediators in such crises, had little influence among the post-World War I black leaders. By 1920, there was no powerful segment of the black leadership that favored the Hampton-Tuskegee accommodationist approach to race relations and political conflict. In March 1920, the NAACP's *Crisis* published a revealing article by Harry H. Jones, which argued that, except for R. R. Moton, few black leaders accepted the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy of racial accommodation. The liberal and radical wings of the black intelligentsia were the dominant political voices in the black community, and the philanthropists understood the impact of this influence on their own political program. Philanthropist George Peabody, having read the Jones article, informed Hampton's principal, James Gregg, of its implications: "It is clear to me, with the Negro people having found themselves in a general way, during the war excitement, there is some danger of sharp definitely conscious line of division. We must, I think, give great weight in the present temper of susceptibility to the advertising influence of the *Crisis* and other publications, including James Weldon Johnson and *The New York Age*." The problem, then, from the standpoint of the philanthropists, was how to secure an articulate black conservative wing with sufficient status within the race to counter the influence of such men as Du Bois, Trotter, and Johnson.<sup>29</sup>

Peabody wanted a conservative black leader to "write the most effective reply, which I have in mind, to the article in the March issue of the *Crisis*." But he did not believe that Moton or Fred Moore, the *New York Age's* editor, who sympathized with Moton's accommodationist philosophy, had sufficient status to challenge Johnson and Du Bois. In fact, Peabody could only think of Isaac Fisher as a potentially effective ideologue of the industrial philanthropic view of black educational and social affairs. Interestingly, Fisher, a Tuskegee graduate who took his ideology from Booker T. Washington, was appointed to the Fisk University administration shortly after McKenzie became president. When McKenzie suspended the student-operated *Fisk Herald* in 1917, he established the conservative *Fisk University News* and made Fisher its editor. Following the bitter race riots of 1919, in a period of rising black militancy, Fisher called for the return of the "conservative Negro." He castigated the liberal and radical segments of the existing black leadership, claiming that they had "muzzled" the voice of the conservative Negro and taken away his "mandate to speak for his race." Fisher defined the conservative Negro leader as one who urges his people to lay a foundation in economic efficiency, submits willingly to the laws and customs of the South, and works for better race relations through the guidance of the "best white South." Toward this end, he instituted at Fisk in 1917 a seminar on race relations and later became a member of the southern-white-dominated Commission on Inter-racial Co-operation. Yet such conservatives as Fisher and Moton could not really challenge the intellectual leadership the liberals and radicals had achieved in the black community by 1919. Du Bois probably expressed the dominant black view of the conservative wing when he informed the Commission on Inter-racial Co-operation that "Isaac Fisher represents

nothing but his own blubbing self. Major Moton is a fine fellow, but weak in the presence of white folks." To Du Bois and many other black leaders who demanded full American rights for blacks, Moton and Fisher were "the sort of Colored men that we call 'White Folks' Niggers.'" Whether they were such accommodationists was less important than their lack of influence among the postwar black leaders and especially among the masses. The black leaders of the postwar period reflected the self-determinist and militant character of the larger Afro-American society. Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association epitomized some of the core values and fundamental political thoughts of the masses of Afro-Americans. Garvey arrived in the United States from Jamaica in 1916 and by 1922 had several hundred thousand followers. He led the largest mass movement among Afro-American before the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The political thrust toward self-determination and militant demands for equality and racial justice were also manifested in the emergence of a more liberal black press and the literary tenor of the "Harlem Renaissance." Historian V. P. Franklin argues convincingly that the postwar self-determinist political and literary activities reflected values deeply embedded in black culture and tradition.<sup>30</sup>

These developments reaffirmed the industrial philanthropists' growing convictions of the necessity to take hold of black higher education and to influence more directly the training of black leaders. Hence, during the early 1920s they launched two national endowment campaigns that incorporated several of their major goals to shape postsecondary black education and develop the "right type" of black teachers and leaders. One campaign was to raise a million-dollar endowment for Fisk University. This campaign embodied the industrial philanthropists' plan to develop one or two black private colleges to the point that they would set new standards for black higher education and thus stigmatize the "inferior" or less fortunate ones, possibly pressuring them to discontinue or convert to secondary schools. The other endowment campaign aimed to raise at least \$5 million to be split equally between Hampton and Tuskegee. This campaign reflected the industrial philanthropists' continuing commitment to the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea. They recognized, however, that Hampton and Tuskegee must meet higher educational standards if the graduates were to continue to obtain teaching jobs and other positions of leadership. Together these campaigns, conducted by the same group of industrial philanthropists, were also intended to develop sympathetic harmony between the liberal arts colleges and the industrial schools.

Not surprisingly, the industrial philanthropists selected Fisk University as the college to be developed into a model institution of black higher education. Fisk was at the financial crossroads that precipitated the transformation of the power structure in black private higher education from missionary to industrial philanthropy. President George A. Gates, who headed Fisk from 1909 to 1913, faced a drying up of the old missionary sources of revenue and, in turn, made a strong plea for southern white friendship and financial support. Booker T. Washington had been appointed to the Board of Trustees in 1909 with the hope that he would bring some of his sources of revenue to Fisk. Fisk was also selected because the industrial philanthropists regarded it as the "capstone" of black private higher education. Wallace Buttrick said: "Perhaps the most promising of the academic institutions for the higher education of the Negro is Fisk University." Outside of Howard University, Fisk had nearly 20 percent of the private black college students enumerated in Thomas Jesse Jones's 1917 survey of black higher education. Fisk enrolled 188 of the 737 college students in private black colleges (this figure excludes the 1,050 college students enrolled in Howard University); Virginia Union University, with 51, had the next largest enrollment. Thus when the General Education Board held its 1915 conference to discuss the reorganization of black higher education, Fisk University's newly appointed white president, Fayette Avery McKenzie, was invited as a key representative of black higher education. Convinced that McKenzie was sympathetic to the board's policy, the industrial philanthropists selected him and his institution to spearhead their campaign to reshape black higher education.<sup>31</sup>

McKenzie, a professor of sociology at the Ohio State University before coming to Fisk in 1915, came to Nashville as a representative of industrial philanthropy. He dedicated his presidency to modernizing the curriculum (that is, emphasizing physical and social sciences) and raising a sizable endowment for the university. Industrial philanthropists regarded him as a leader who would break with the missionary or egalitarian past and lead Fisk down a path of conciliation and



cooperation with conservative northern and southern whites. More than any of his predecessors, McKenzie sought to make Fisk acceptable to the white South and northern industrial philanthropists. He urged Fisk students and graduates to eschew political and social questions and concentrate on interracial cooperation and economic development. In his inaugural address, McKenzie paid homage to Fisk's liberal arts tradition but emphasized the concept of education for "service." In this context he promised that the university would help restore the South to economic prosperity: "It was the function of Fisk to increase the material wealth of the nation. . . . Fisk University claims the right to say that it will be one of the chief factors in achieving larger prosperity for the South. Every dollar spent here in the creation of power may mean a thousand dollars of increase in wealth of the South within a single generation." In line with these goals and priorities, McKenzie favored autocratic rule over his students and faculty, sought personal associations mainly with the teachers and administrators of the white schools in Nashville, and cultivated the goodwill of the city's white business community. These actions pleased the industrial philanthropists, and they regarded McKenzie's reign as a new and wise departure from the missionary tradition.<sup>32</sup>

From the outset, industrial philanthropists reinforced McKenzie's behavior by contributing their economic and political support to his regime. Julius Rosenwald, who visited Fisk at McKenzie's installation, was initially ambivalent about the possibility of transforming the college into an accommodationist institution. In revealing his "mixed feelings" about Fisk students to Abraham Flexner, Rosenwald stated, "There seemed to be an air of superiority among them and a desire to take on the spirit of the white university rather than the spirit which has always impressed me at Tuskegee." Rosenwald and other industrial philanthropists believed that Tuskegee was training black leaders to maintain a separate and subordinate Negro society. They were primarily interested in supporting black institutions committed to this mission. Thus Flexner assured Rosenwald that McKenzie, with the help of industrial philanthropy, was working to transform Fisk into an institution more acceptable to southern white society. Toward this end, the General Education Board began appropriating in 1916 about \$12,000 annually to help Fisk pay its yearly operating expenses. In 1917 the board contributed \$50,000 to Fisk for endowment and building purposes and persuaded the Carnegie Foundation to give the same amount. Still, Fisk had no substantial endowment, was deeply in debt, and suffered from a deteriorating physical plant and a poorly paid faculty. According to Hollingsworth Wood, vice-chairman of the Fisk Board of Trustees, "\$1,600 has been the maximum salary of a professor at Fisk University. This has meant lack of food in some cases." Fisk authorities knew that the college could not survive without a sizable endowment, and the industrial philanthropists were the only source of sufficient money. These circumstances, however, required compromise. As McKenzie put it, "Intimation has been made to me from several sources that if we continue to behave ourselves, if we are efficient in teaching and administration and continue to hold the right relationship to our environment, we can expect large and highly valuable financial aid in carrying out a great program at Fisk."<sup>33</sup>

The philanthropists' financial assistance to Fisk University was accompanied by a new coalition of Negro accommodationists, southern whites, and northern industrialists who took control of the university's administration from the old alliance of black educators and northern white missionaries. McKenzie and the philanthropists restructured the Fisk Board of Trustees to reflect the new power structure. In October 1915 Thomas Jesse Jones informed Flexner of the changes: "The Board of Trustees is being strengthened. Governor Brumbaugh and two influential colored men have been added in the last few weeks. With Mr. Cravath and Dr. Washington as trustees and the constant attention which I can give to the institution, we have at least a guarantee of fairly sound educational policy." By 1919, Jones was executive secretary of the Fisk Board of Trustees and one of five members on the Executive Committee. In 1920 the philanthropists, acting through the General Education Board, agreed to spearhead a campaign to obtain for Fisk a \$1 million endowment, and their strength on the university's Board of Trustees increased. William H. Baldwin, son of the General Education Board's first chairman, was appointed by the board to chair the endowment committee. He was immediately appointed to the Fisk Board of Trustees and became, in 1924, the chairman of the trustees' Executive Committee. Other conservatives were added as the philanthropists moved in a quiet and forceful manner to reorganize the school's administration. In May 1920,

Hollingsworth Wood notified the president of the General Education Board that "Dr. Moton of Tuskegee is now on the Board; Miss Ella Sachs, daughter of Samuel Sachs, and a close friend of the Rosenwalds, is an eager new member; and Mrs. Beverly B. Mumford of Richmond, Virginia adds an excellent influence from the southern viewpoint." The traditional missionary equalitarians were gradually pushed off the Fisk Board of Trustees. They were replaced mainly by northern industrialists, southern whites, and a few Negro accommodationists who were virtually handpicked by industrial philanthropists. The philanthropists were raising an endowment for a new Fisk that was largely controlled by their agents and supporters.<sup>34</sup>

These philanthropists no doubt hoped that their economic and firm political hold on Fisk would squelch the school's equalitarian tradition and open the way for the development of a more conservative black leadership class. In 1923 the General Education Board generated a memorandum on the Fisk endowment campaign which emphasized the urgent need to train "the right type of colored leaders" who would help make the Negro "a capable workman and a good citizen." The industrial philanthropists, as the memorandum stated, aimed primarily at "helping the Negro to the sane and responsible leadership that the South wants him to have." To the white South, "sane" Negro leaders were those who encouraged blacks to "stay in their place." The philanthropists recognized that they were facing a new situation between the races. "How the Negro is going to get on in this country and what his relations are to be with the whites, are no longer problems of a single section; they are national," the memorandum stated. To the philanthropists, this new situation, in the context of growing racial friction, increased the necessity of training "the right kind" of black leaders. The report maintained:

Due to various experiences during and since the World War, there is a growing disposition among the Negroes to suspect all white men and their motives and therefore to break all contacts with them and go it alone. Because such a movement by ten percent of the population is obviously futile, is no reason to overlook the fact that ten percent is a large enough proportion to cause considerable harm if permitted to go off at a tangent from the general interest. This very real menace to the public welfare makes the strengthening of school facilities for Negroes a matter of national significance.

Both McKenzie and the industrial philanthropists shared the belief that the new type of black college should help curb and even extinguish the self-determinist and equalitarian character of the emergent black leadership.<sup>35</sup>

Toward this end McKenzie, as Raymond Wolters has shown, set out to convince the industrial philanthropists that "Fisk students were not radical egalitarians but young men and women who had learned to make peace with the reality of the caste system." Thus McKenzie disbanded the student government association, forbade student dissent, and suspended the *Fisk Herald*, the oldest student publication among black colleges. He would not allow a campus chapter of the NAACP and instructed the librarian to excise radical articles in the NAACP literature. Student discipline was rigorously enforced, special "Jim Crow" entertainments were arranged for the white benefactors of the university, and Paul D. Cravath, president of the Fisk Board of Trustees, endorsed complete racial separation as "the only solution to the Negro problem." McKenzie would not allow certain forms of social intercourse such as dancing and holding hands, and he justified his code of discipline on the grounds that black students were particularly sensuous beings who needed to be subjected to firm control. In short, McKenzie attempted to repress student initiative, undermine their equalitarian spirit, and control their thinking on race relations so as to produce a class of black intellectuals that would uncomplainingly accept the southern racial hierarchy. Historian Lester C. Lamson concluded that "McKenzie's autocratic policies took away means of self-expression, created second-class citizens, and relied upon fear instead of reason to bring societal control." Although discipline and repression of student initiative and self-expression were strict before McKenzie became president, they became harsher and more racist during his administration.<sup>36</sup>

By June 1924, the industrial philanthropists had successfully completed their campaign for Fisk's million-dollar endowment. The following pledges were then in hand: \$500,000 from the General Education Board; \$250,000 from the Carnegie Foundation; and \$250,000 secured elsewhere, including sizable pledges from such philanthropists as Julius Rosenwald and George Peabody. This endowment fund was not, however, collectible until Fisk's accumulated deficits were met. The outstanding indebtedness at the time was \$70,000. To solve that problem, a special campaign to raise \$50,000 led by Nashville's white citizens was successfully completed by June 1924. This campaign was organized by Nashville's Commercial Club, which included Tennessee's governor, Nashville's mayor, and many of the city's leading businessmen. From 1915 to 1924, Fisk had become so conservative that the Commercial Club was inspired to call Fisk the "key" to interracial cooperation and understanding in the South. "He came into our midst unknown," the Commercial Club said of McKenzie, "and by his wise administration and official methods won our hearty cooperation." With such backing, plans were perfected for raising the money to eliminate the school's deficits and thereby secure the endowment for Fisk's financial rehabilitation.<sup>37</sup>

At this juncture, however, McKenzie's conservative administration was attacked by black students, intellectuals, and community organizations. Led by W. E. B. Du Bois, the Fisk alumni attacked McKenzie's Draconian code of student discipline and expressed outrage at the humiliation and insults perpetrated on the student body. Du Bois openly challenged the school's administration in 1924, when he was invited to give the commencement address. He especially criticized the administration's campaign to suppress Fisk's equalitarian tradition so as to obtain economic support from industrial philanthropy. The students, long dissatisfied with McKenzie's regime, were reinforced by alumni support and escalated their protest against the school's repressive policies. In February 1925, the *New York Times* reported that Fisk's alumni were organizing in "all sections of the United States to agitate for the removal of Dr. Fayette McKenzie, the white president of the University." The following month the students went on strike against McKenzie's administration, and they were backed in their protest by the alumni, the black press, and the local black community. On the day following the student rebellion more than twenty-five hundred black citizens of Nashville convened and formally declared that McKenzie's "usefulness as president of Fisk is at an end." This protest forced McKenzie to resign in April 1925. Fisk University trustee Thomas Jesse Jones attributed McKenzie's problems to black self-determination, the very force that he and other industrial philanthropists were trying to counter. As he wrote to fellow trustee, Paul Cravath,

The present unfortunate and unfair criticism of Dr. McKenzie's policies is partly the result of misunderstandings, but largely the result of an effort on the part of a few designing Negroes to obtain control of Fisk University for a policy of Negro self-determination, so extreme in extent as to undermine all cooperation between whites and Negroes. Such an extreme attitude has appeared within the last few years in many parts of the world. While it is natural and in its more reasonable forms desirable, self-determination, as advocated by those who oppose Dr. McKenzie, is dangerous not only to the well-being of Fisk University, but to sound race-relationships throughout America.<sup>38</sup>

Du Bois praised the students' victory over McKenzie and hailed them as a new breed of black intellectuals sorely needed to challenge the power of industrial philanthropy: "God speed the breed! Suppose we do lose Fisk; suppose we lose every cent that the entrenched millionaires have set aside to buy our freedom and stifle our complaints. They have the power, they have the wealth, but glory to God we still own our own souls and led by young men like these at Fisk, let us neither flinch nor falter, but fight, and fight and fight again." But many black intellectuals, especially those responsible for black colleges, could not easily afford to attack the policies of industrial philanthropy. After the Fisk rebellion, the General Education Board withheld the endowment pledges on the grounds that they were not collectible until Fisk eliminated all its deficits. The Nashville Commercial Club, which was expected to raise the capital to cover the deficits, withdrew from the campaign following McKenzie's resignation. Convinced that McKenzie's successor, Thomas Elsa

Jones, did "not conceive himself to be a leader or an emancipator of the Negro group," the philanthropists eventually granted Fisk the endowment. Fisk, however, was still dependent on industrial philanthropy throughout the period and into the present.<sup>39</sup>

Although northern philanthropists sought to move Fisk and other black colleges closer to the philosophy and practice of racial accommodation throughout the first third of the twentieth century, they seemed comfortable only with Hampton, Tuskegee, and similar industrial normal schools. This attitude was revealed through their parallel involvement in the Hampton-Tuskegee endowment campaign. To be sure, they recognized that educational standards at these institutions had to change to keep abreast of minimum requirements for teacher certification, but they saw no need to modify the basic social philosophy of black accommodation to white authority. The campaign for \$5 million was organized during the summer of 1924 by Clarence H. Kelsey, chairman of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company and vice-chairman of the Hampton Board of Trustees. Anson Phelps-Stokes was appointed from the Tuskegee Board of Trustees as chairman of the Special Gifts Committee. The John Price Jones Corporation was engaged to prepare the publicity for the campaign and to help with the organizational work. As a result of these efforts, the following subscriptions had been secured by the end of the first year: George Eastman, \$4.3 million; General Education Board, \$1 million; John D. Rockefeller, Jr., \$1 million; Arthur Curtis James, \$300,000; Edward H. Harkness, \$250,000; Julius Rosenwald, \$100,000. Amounts equal to or greater than \$25,000 were pledged by the Phelps-Stokes Fund (the largest contribution it ever made to any single object), Slater Fund, George Foster Peabody, William M. Scott, William G. Wilcox, and the Madame C. J. Walker Manufacturing Company. George Eastman, largely as a result of this campaign, became deeply impressed with the importance of the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea to the nation and on 8 December 1924 announced that in the distribution of the major portion of his estate, Hampton and Tuskegee would each obtain securities valued at \$2 million. This pledge was conditional on his requirement that the Hampton-Tuskegee endowment campaign reach its \$5 million goal by 31 December 1925. Eastman also contributed another \$300,000 toward the goal of \$5 million. Anson Phelps-Stokes believed that Eastman's gift resulted from a visit to his home by Julius Rosenwald, Clarence Kelsey, and Robert Moton in November 1924.<sup>40</sup>

The "Special Memorandum" to promote the Hampton-Tuskegee campaign was prepared for Kelsey by the Jones Corporation, and it detailed the reasons for the endowment campaign and the continuing importance of the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea. Part Two of the memorandum, "Our Most Grave and Perplexing Domestic Problem," was introduced with the following quotations:

"The Color line is the problem of the present century."

"The relation of Whites and Negroes in the United States is our most grave and perplexing domestic problem."

"The Negro problem is one of the greatest questions that has ever presented itself to the American people."

These quotations were attributed to J. W. Gregory, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, and William Howard Taft, respectively. This problem, according to the memorandum, had been exacerbated because the "rise of world-wide race consciousness and ideal of self-determination has had special effect on the American Negro." Consequently, "a wide variety of leadership has sprung up to give them expression." This development was viewed largely as a crisis of leadership:

Some of this leadership, as is natural under the circumstances, is demagogical or otherwise self seeking. Some of it is patently visionary. But there are thousands of earnest, intelligent Negroes today who are fired with a belief in the possibilities within their race and with the ambition to help realize those possibilities sanely and constructively. This whole movement, in all its various forms, has taken deep root. It is not confined to the big city groups but permeates every part of the country. A remarkable Negro periodical and daily press has grown up within the past few years devoted, almost wholly, to advancing, directly or indirectly, these ideas.

The memorandum pointed out that it was "impossible, even if it were desirable, to stop this movement." The important thing was to assure its development in "a sound and constructive form."<sup>41</sup>

The industrial philanthropists believed that the right black leaders could direct the masses along "constructive" lines. "As the Negro progresses," the report stated, "the ideals of at least the sound thinking majority will be most influenced by those of advanced education and experience." Herein were the reasons to raise Hampton and Tuskegee to a level of "advanced education" and to influence the attitudes of emergent black leaders, whether they were trained in advanced industrial schools or academic colleges. From the philanthropists' standpoint, the solution to the race problem was self-evident. First, "The Negro problem has been happily and permanently solved by the application of the Hampton-Tuskegee method in many individual communities." Second, "The Hampton-Tuskegee Idea, therefore, of solving the race problem in America is to *multiply these local solutions and the national problem solves itself.*" Third, "The proposed method for doing this is to *multiply the number of Hampton and Tuskegee men and women adequately trained for present day leadership.*" Although Armstrong had died in 1893, Booker T. Washington in 1915, and H. B. Frissell in 1917, the industrial philanthropists remained steadfastly committed to the Hampton-Tuskegee methods as the fundamental solution to the race problem. Anson Phelps-Stokes said in a letter to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.: "Personally, I am increasingly convinced that Hampton and Tuskegee provide the most important contribution yet found towards the solution of the race problem in this country, and towards the development of the Negro people so as to make them fitted for the highest citizenship." Throughout the endowment campaign the industrial philanthropists reminded themselves and the larger society that the Hampton methods produced Booker T. Washington, "the outstanding Negro leader of the past," and that every president of the United States, from Grant to Calvin Coolidge, had supported the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea. President Garfield was a trustee of Tuskegee, and William Howard Taft became a trustee of Hampton while president of the United States and was, in 1925, president of Hampton's Board of Trustees. For the industrial philanthropists, the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea had become a matter of tried and true methods, of tradition, and had congealed into a permanent policy.<sup>42</sup>

The basic social philosophy underlying the Hampton-Tuskegee program for the training of black leaders remained unchanged. It was still a program of interracial harmony predicated on a social foundation of political disfranchisement, civil inequality, racial segregation, and the training of black youth for certain racially prescribed economic positions. The central question was whether this social and educational philosophy could remain intact as Hampton and Tuskegee were transformed from normal schools to secondary schools with certain forms of collegiate work. Nearly one-half, or \$2 million, of the Hampton endowment was earmarked for "teacher training of collegiate grade now required by southern States." Attached to the endowment campaign's "Special Memorandum" were regulations governing certificates for teachers in North Carolina and Alabama. In 1925 North Carolina required for a high school teacher's certificate graduation from a "standard A Grade college in academic or scientific courses, embracing 120 semester hours," 18 of which had to be in professional educational subjects. Alabama required three years of standard college work approved by the State Board of Education, including nine hours of professional study. Such requirements forced Hampton and Tuskegee into the world of collegiate education. They started by offering the Bachelor of Science in agriculture and teaching, trying hard to hold closely to their traditional emphasis, but were soon compelled to expand the collegiate departments to cover a range of liberal arts fields.<sup>43</sup>

This very yielding to the new educational standards changed the social composition of the institution's student population, and the question of whether the Armstrong-Washington philosophy could prevail at the collegiate level was answered in part by the Hampton student strike of 1927. Traditionally, the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea rested on a denigration of academic subjects, which was easier to maintain when the institutions were composed of half-grown elementary students, regimented to strict military discipline, and overworked in simple agricultural and industrial tasks. But the new collegiate programs attracted different students. Although the total number of students

enrolled at Hampton remained at about a thousand throughout the 1920s, the number of students in the college division grew steadily, from 21 in 1920 to 417 in 1927. By 1929, no new high school students were admitted. The new college-level students repeatedly insisted that academic standards be raised. In 1924 Hampton's Student Council charged that the director of the trade school had so little formal education and used such poor English that he was not qualified to teach. Similar accusations were lodged in 1925 against several teachers in the school of agriculture. There were additional complaints that white teachers were less concerned with academic subjects than with teaching manners and morals. Indeed, five of Hampton's white teachers participated in a Ku Klux Klan parade in support of a law requiring racial segregation on Hampton's campus, and other white instructors established a segregated club and openly opposed the employment of qualified black teachers. In response to Hampton's low academic standards and repressive racial policies, the students went on strike in October 1927. They demanded an end to racism and paternalism and insisted that "our educational system be so revised that we shall no longer be subjected to instructions from teachers whose apparent education is below that of the average student." The students' demands, breaking with tradition, called essentially for an abandonment of the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea. Such matters were not easily settled on a campus that had devoted more than half a century to a philosophy of racial subordination and industrial training. Student unrest and contention between the faculty and administration persisted into the spring of 1929. Confronted with this disorder, James E. Gregg, successor to H. B. Frissell, was forced to resign his office. The Hampton Board of Trustees quickly concurred. Thus both the principal of Hampton and the president of Fisk University, men who presided over the institutions' first significant endowments, were forced to resign their office because the students rejected the very policies and social philosophy that underlay the endowment campaigns.<sup>44</sup>

The Hampton students put the final nail in the coffin of the old Hampton-Tuskegee Idea. As Robert A. Coles, one of the leaders of the student revolt, said, Hampton's new students possessed "a Du Bois ambition" that would not mix with "a Booker Washington education." Such attitudes reflected an increasing demand for collegiate education among black youth of the 1920s. Despite the industrial philanthropists' efforts to reduce the number of black colleges (through their scheme of making one or two vastly superior to the others) and their attempt to transform industrial training into a collegiate program, black youth and their parents pushed for and achieved more and better higher educational opportunities. The enrollment of college students in public colleges in the sixteen former slave states and the District of Columbia grew from 12 in 1915 to 12,631 in 1935, and, as illustrated in Table 2, the enrollment in private colleges in 1935 was 16,638. In 1915 there were only 2,474 students enrolled in the black private colleges. These accomplishments and the beliefs and behavior that brought them about specifically rejected the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea and its philosophy of manual training and racial subordination. The industrial philanthropists, as evidenced by their contributions of time, money, and effort during the Hampton-Tuskegee endowment campaign, did not voluntarily abandon the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea. Rather, the philosophy was decisively rejected by the black students and leaders of the 1920s, and the key institutions were compelled by changing educational requirements and student demands to become standard institutions of higher learning. Thus was ushered in a new and different era in black higher education, and all concerned parties, blacks, missionaries, industrial philanthropists, and southern whites, had to adjust to this new departure. The battles for control and influence over the training of black leaders did not cease, but they were fought on a different terrain.<sup>45</sup>

TABLE 2

*Black College and Professional Students in Private and Public  
Colleges in Southern States and the District of Columbia, by Sex, 1935*

State or District of Columbia	Private college students		Public college students		Public and private college students
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total
Alabama	793	676	325	554	2,348
Arkansas	138	203	173	172	686
Delaware	0	0	33	50	83
District of Columbia	1,069	894	148	587	2,698
Florida	132	141	267	241	782
Georgia	907	1,078	136	198	2,319
Kentucky	0	0	288	510	798
Louisiana	575	569	273	270	1,687
Maryland	163	298	66	188	715
Mississippi	184	297	127	79	687
Missouri	0	0	215	340	559
North Carolina	652	830	782	1,722	3,986
South Carolina	542	770	254	247	1,813
Tennessee	881	945	460	793	3,079
Texas	740	1,097	453	700	2,990
Virginia	960	1,103	495	523	3,081
West Virginia	0	0	464	494	958
Total	7,736	8,902	4,963	7,668	29,269

Source: Blose and Caliver, *Statistics of the Education of Negroes*, pp. 37-40.

The progress of black higher education during the 1930s was mixed. The northern missionaries and black educators who presided over the black colleges entered the 1920s extremely worried about the financial and material conditions of black colleges. Then, during the 1930s, northern industrial philanthropists presented black college educators with good opportunities for improving the material conditions of black higher education. To be sure, financial solvency was critical, but it was only a means to the more important and long-standing mission of black higher education. For the northern missionaries and black educators, the great mission of black colleges was that of training a competent leadership, men and women who could think, who were independent and self-reliant, and who could persuade and lead the black masses. This mission was contradicted by the wonderful material improvements in endowments, physical plants, and faculty salaries because the industrial philanthropists who provided these gifts pressed continuously for the spontaneous loyalty of the college-bred Negro. As black colleges became increasingly dependent on donations from northern industrial philanthropists, the missionaries and black educators found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accept philanthropic gifts and assert simultaneously that many of the political and economic aims of the philanthropists were at variance with the fundamental interests of the black masses. From 1915 to 1960, the General Education Board alone expended for black higher education (exclusive of grants for medical education) over \$41 million. The board disbursed over \$5 million to Atlanta University; \$5 million to Fisk University; \$3.8 million to Tuskegee Institute; \$3.5 million to Spelman College; \$2.15 million to Dillard University; \$1.9 million to Morehouse College; and \$1.1 million to Clark College. The board symbolized the central place that northern philanthropists had come to occupy in the development of black higher education in the

South. Given the industrial philanthropists' demand for a conservative black leadership that would cooperate with instead of challenge the Jim Crow system, a certain amount of compromise, indifference, apathy, and even fear developed among black college educators and students.<sup>46</sup>

Observers of the black colleges during the 1930s were dismayed at the apparent shift in consciousness among black college educators and students which paralleled the colleges' increasing dependence on the purse strings of northern industrial philanthropy. As early as 1930, W. E. B. Du Bois, in a commencement address at Howard University, chastised the black college male students for their nihilistic behavior:

Our college man today is, on the average, a man untouched by real culture. He deliberately surrenders to selfish and even silly ideals, swarming into semiprofessional athletics and Greek letter societies, and affecting to despise scholarship and the hard grind of study and research. The greatest meetings of the Negro college year like those of the white college year have become vulgar exhibitions of liquor, extravagance, and fur coats. We have in our colleges a growing mass of stupidity and indifference.

Du Bois and other prominent black intellectuals worried that black college students and educators had forsaken their obligation to become socially responsible leaders of their people. Historian and educator Carter G. Woodson argued in 1933 that the "mis-education" of black students had resulted in the creation of a highly educated bourgeois that was estranged from ordinary black people, "the very people upon whom they must eventually count for carrying out a program of progress." In 1934 writer and poet Langston Hughes denounced the "cowards from the colleges," the "meek professors and well-paid presidents," who submitted willingly to racism and the general subordination of black people. The following year, George Streater, business manager of the *Crisis*, proclaimed that black college faculty were much too conservative, "years behind the New Deal." "Further," said Streater, "Negro college students are not radical; they are reactionary." Such critics showed little sympathy for the black college educators' inability openly to protest against the system of racial caste and still expect to be well received in philanthropic circles.<sup>47</sup>

Some educators in black colleges, however, were also disturbed by the growing apathy and social irresponsibility of black college students. In 1937, Lafayette Harris, president of Philander Smith College in Little Rock, Arkansas, castigated black students for their general apathy and particular estrangement from common black folk: "Probably nothing gives one more concern than the frequently apparent fatalistic and nonchalant attitude of many a Negro college student and educated Negro. With him, very little seems to matter except meals, sleep, and folly. Community problems are never even recognized as existing. They know nothing of their less fortunate fellow-men and care less." The following year Randolph Edmonds, a professor at Dillard University, blamed black college educators for the attitudes of black students toward the masses. "The Negro youth is being educated to regard the race with contempt, not only by white teachers in mixed schools, but by Negro instructors in Negro colleges." The central contention of much of this criticism was that the college-bred Negroes, or "talented tenth," were not being educated to think and act in behalf of the interests of black people. Rather, they were internalizing a social ideology nearly indistinguishable from that of the philanthropists who helped finance black higher education. As one black student assessed the social consciousness of black educated leaders in 1938, "The American race problem has brought us many anomalies. But it may be some time before it equals the Negro leader, supported by workingmen's dollars, leading a working population, and yet enunciating a philosophy which would do credit to the original economic royalist or the most eloquent spokesman for America's 'sixty sinister families.'" In vital respects, the fate of black higher education during the 1930s was closely related to the attitudes and interests of the nation's wealthiest families. Only black college educators could appreciate fully the difficulty of depending on this wealth while being urged to articulate a philosophy that challenged the philanthropists' conceptions of proper race and social relations.<sup>48</sup>

Undoubtedly, the verbal attacks upon black college educators and students during the 1930s were engendered in part by the growing liberalism of the era. The social critics may have been



excessively harsh and even off the mark in their judgments of the social consciousness of black college educators and students. Black college educators had to steer between two equally critical courses. On one hand, they were dependent on the benevolence of industrial philanthropists for the very survival of the private black colleges that formed the backbone of black higher education. On the other hand, it was their mission to represent the struggles and aspirations of black people and to articulate the very source of the masses' discomfort and oppression. One course propelled them into conflict with the other because the industrial philanthropists supported black subordination. Black college educators had no noble path out of this contradiction and sought to contain it by placating northern industrial philanthropists while training black intellectuals who would help lead black people toward greater freedom and justice. Indeed, it was a painful and difficult course to steer that frequently brought down upon black college educators the wrath of both sides. This was a moment in the history of black higher education when presidents and faculty could do little more than succeed in keeping their institutions together while maintaining themselves and their students with as great a sense of dignity as was possible. When their students helped launch the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the hard work of these educators seemed far more heroic in the hour of harvest than it did during the years of cultivation.

## Notes

1. Logan, "Evolution of Private Colleges for Negroes," p. 216; Jones, *Negro Education*, 2: 310; Klein, *Survey of Negro Colleges and Universities*; Holmes, *Evolution of the Negro College*, p. 201.
2. Holmes, *Evolution of the Negro College*, pp. 163-177.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 216; Klein, *Survey of Negro Colleges and Universities*, pp. 5-33.
4. Richardson, *Christian Reconstruction*, p. 173; missionary philanthropists quoted from Holmes, *Evolution of the Negro College*, p. 69; Wright, "Development of Education for Blacks in Georgia," p. 31.
5. Butchart, "Educating for Freedom," p. 353; Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, p. 244; Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom*, p. 532.
6. Freedmen's Aid Society quoted from Holmes, *Evolution of the Negro College*, p. 69; Bond, "Century of Negro Higher Education," p. 187; Butchart, "Educating for Freedom," pp. 453-490; Wright, "Development of Education for Blacks in Georgia," p. 29; Logan, "Evolution of Private Colleges for Negroes," p. 216.
7. Richardson, *Christian Reconstruction*, pp. 113, 123, 128; Bond, "Century of Negro Higher Education," pp. 187-188.
8. Richardson, *Christian Reconstruction*, p. 125; McPherson, *Abolitionist Legacy*, pp. 213, 222; Morehouse quoted in *ibid.*, p. 222.
9. Richardson, *Christian Reconstruction*, p. 125; Merrill quoted in McPherson, *Abolitionist Legacy*, p. 220.
10. Du Bois quoted in McPherson, *Abolitionist Legacy*, p. 223.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
13. Baldwin, "Present Problem of Negro Education," pp. 52-60; Anderson, "Education for Servitude," pp. 208-216.
14. Weinberg, *A Chance to Learn*, p. 280.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 267, 280; Badger, "Negro Colleges and Universities"; Jones, *Negro Education*, 1: 59.
16. Selden, *Accreditation*, pp. 32-37; Green, "Higher Standards for the Negro College"; Cozart, *History of the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools*.
17. Selden, *Accreditation*, pp. 35-37.
18. Du Bois, *College-Bred Negro*, Du Bois and Dill, eds., *College-Bred Negro American*, Jones, *Negro Education*, 1: 58, 64; Green, "Higher Standards for the Negro College"; Cozart, *History of the Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools*. Hampton and Tuskegee, the two black educational

- institutions most favored by industrial philanthropists, were excluded from consideration because they were normal schools and it was their mission to provide precollegiate education for the training of common school teachers.
19. Morgan to Buttrick, 25, 29, 31 Jan. 1901, Sale to Buttrick, 23 Dec. 1909, 8 Jan. 1908, Box 716, Sale to Buttrick, 1 Jan. 1908, MacVicar to Buttrick, 7 June, 12 Aug. 1902, Buttrick to MacVicar, 18 Aug. 1902, Hovey to Buttrick, 30 Mar. 1908, Box 170, GEB Papers; Jones, *Negro Education*, 1: 7-8.
  20. Sale to Buttrick, 8 Jan. 1908, Box 170, Morgan to Buttrick, 31 Jan., 1 Feb. 1901, Box 717, GEB Papers.
  21. Harlan and Smock, eds., *Booker T. Washington Papers*, 3: 620; Buttrick to Rockefeller, 5 Feb. 1914, Box 203, GEB Papers.
  22. Buttrick to Sale, 29 May 1907, Box 59, Report of Williams to Buttrick, 22 May 1907, Buttrick to the General Education Board, 22 May 1907, Box 716, GEB Papers.
  23. Fosdick, *Adventure in Giving*, pp. 151-155; Hine, "Pursuit of Professional Equality," pp. 176-177.
  24. Buttrick to Rockefeller, 5 Feb. 1914, Flexner to Villard, 1 Dec. 1914, Box 203, "General Education Board's Conference on Negro Education," 19 Nov. 1915, GEB Papers; Du Bois, "Thomas Jesse Jones," p. 253; Berman, "Educational Colonialism in Africa," pp. 183-194; King, *Pan-Africanism and Education*, pp. 43-57.
  25. "General Education Board's Conference on Negro Education," 29 Nov. 1915, pp. 133-134.
  26. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-138, 149-152, 162-164.
  27. Report of Committee on Negro Education, 24 Jan. 1916, Box 722, GEB Papers.
  28. Logan, *The Negro in the United States*, pp. 74-83; Moton to Wilson, 15 June 1918, Box 303, GEB Papers.
  29. Jones, "Crisis in Negro Leadership"; Peabody to Gregg, 5 Apr. 1920, Box 58, Peabody Papers.
  30. Peabody to Gregg, 5 Apr. 1920, Box 58, Peabody Papers; *Fisk University News*, Sept. 1919, pp. 2-4; Du Bois to Eleazer, 12 Mar. 1926, Commission on Inter-racial Co-operation Collection; Franklin, *Black Self-Determination*.
  31. Jones, *Negro Education*, 1: 310, 314-315; "General Education Board's Conference on Negro Education," 29 Nov. 1915, GEB Papers; Lamon, "Black Community in Nashville," p. 231.
  32. McKenzie, *Ideals of Fisk*, p. 7; Aptheker, ed., *W. E. B. Du Bois*, pp. 52-57; Du Bois, "Fisk"; Wolters, *New Negro on Campus*, pp. 35-39.
  33. Rosenwald to Flexner, 15 Jan. 1917, Flexner to Rosenwald, 17 Jan. 1917, Box 138, Flexner to Swift, 2 Apr. 1917, Appleget to Thorkelson, 12 June 1928, "Appropriations Made by the General Education Board to Fisk University"; for endowment contributions, see Baldwin to General Education Board, 6 Oct. 1924, Wood to General Education Board, 6 May 1920, Box 128, GEB Papers; *Fisk University News*, Dec. 1924, p. 20.
  34. *Fisk University News*, Apr. 1923, p. 7; *ibid.*, Oct. 1920, p. 21; Jones to Flexner, 4 Oct. 1915, Wood to Buttrick, 6 May 1920, Thorkelson to Wood, 5 Nov. 1926, Box 138, GEB Papers. For the philanthropists' role in actively recruiting trustees, see Flexner to Rosenwald, 8, 17 Jan. 1917, Rosenwald to Flexner, 13 Jan. 1917, Flexner to Swift, 2 Apr. 1917, Flexner to Judson, 27 Mar. 1917, Judson to Flexner, 30 Mar., 13 Apr. 1917, Box 138, GEB Papers.
  35. Flexner, Memorandum on the Fisk Endowment Campaign, 25 May 1923, Box 23, GEB Papers.
  36. The most thorough accounts of McKenzie's repressive educational practices are Wolters, *New Negro on Campus*, pp. 26-69; Lamon, "Fisk University Student Strike"; Richardson, *History of Fisk University*, chaps. 6 and 7.
  37. "Fisk University," a 1926 memorandum, Box 138, GEB Papers; "Fisk Endowment Drive in Nashville," *Fisk University News*, May 1924, pp. 31-32; "First Million-Dollar Endowment for College Education of the Negro in the History of America," *ibid.*, Oct. 1924, pp. 1-13; Commercial Club of Nashville to General Education Board, 24 Jan. 1920, Box 138, GEB Papers; Jones, *Negro Education*, 1: 314-315, 320-321.
  38. Wolters, *New Negro on Campus*, pp. 34-40; *New York Times*, 8 Feb. 1925, sec. 2, p. 1; Jones to Cravath, 20 Sept. 1924, Box 3, Folder 20, McKenzie Papers.